This article is part of a series on the
SameSite cookie attribute changes:
Cookies are one of the methods available for adding persistent state to web sites. Over the years their capabilities have grown and evolved, but left the platform with some problematic legacy issues. To address this, browsers (including Chrome, Firefox, and Edge) are changing their behavior to enforce more privacy-preserving defaults.
Each cookie is a
key=value pair along with a number of attributes that control
when and where that cookie is used. You've probably already used these
attributes to set things like expiration dates or indicating the cookie should
only be sent over HTTPS. Servers set cookies by sending the aptly-named
Set-Cookie header in their response. For all the detail you can dive into
but for now here's a quick refresher.
Say you have a blog where you want to display a "What's new" promo to your users. Users can dismiss the promo and then they won't see it again for a while. You can store that preference in a cookie, set it to expire in a month (2,600,000 seconds), and only send it over HTTPS. That header would look like this:
Set-Cookie: promo_shown=1; Max-Age=2600000; Secure
When your reader views a page that meets those requirements, i.e. they're on a secure connection and the cookie is less than a month old, then their browser will send this header in its request:
document.cookie. Making an assignment to
document.cookie will create or
override a cookie with that key. For example, you can try the following in your
> document.cookie = "promo_shown=1; Max-Age=2600000; Secure"
< "promo_shown=1; Max-Age=2600000; Secure"
document.cookie will output all the cookies accessible in the current
context, with each cookie separated by a semicolon:
< "promo_shown=1; color_theme=peachpuff; sidebar_loc=left"
If you try this on a selection of popular sites you will notice that most of
them set significantly more than just three cookies. In most cases, those
cookies are sent on every single request to that domain, which has a number of
implications. Upload bandwidth is often more restricted than download for your
users, so that overhead on all outbound requests is adding a delay on your time
to first byte. Be conservative in the number and size of cookies you set. Make
use of the
Max-Age attribute to help ensure that cookies don't hang around
longer than needed.
What are first-party and third-party cookies? #
If you go back to that same selection of sites you were looking at before, you probably noticed that there were cookies present for a variety of domains, not just the one you were currently visiting. Cookies that match the domain of the current site, i.e. what's displayed in the browser's address bar, are referred to as first-party cookies. Similarly, cookies from domains other than the current site are referred to as third-party cookies. This isn't an absolute label but is relative to the user's context; the same cookie can be either first-party or third-party depending on which site the user is on at the time.
Continuing the example from above, let's say one of your blog posts has a
picture of a particularly amazing cat in it and it's hosted at
/blog/img/amazing-cat.png. Because it's such an amazing image, another person
uses it directly on their site. If a visitor has been to your blog and has the
promo_shown cookie, then when they view
amazing-cat.png on the other
person's site that cookie will be sent in that request for the image. This
isn't particularly useful for anyone since
promo_shown isn't used for anything
on this other person's site, it's just adding overhead to the request.
If that's an unintended effect, why would you want to do this? It's this mechanism that allows sites to maintain state when they are being used in a third-party context. For example, if you embed a YouTube video on your site then visitors will see a "Watch later" option in the player. If your visitor is already signed in to YouTube, that session is being made available in the embedded player by a third-party cookie—meaning that "Watch later" button will just save the video in one go rather than prompting them to sign in or having to navigate them away from your page and back over to YouTube.
One of the cultural properties of the web is that it's tended to be open by
default. This is part of what has made it possible for so many people to create
their own content and apps there. However, this has also brought a number of
security and privacy concerns. Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks rely on
the fact that cookies are attached to any request to a given origin, no matter
who initiates the request. For example, if you visit
evil.example then it can
trigger requests to
your-blog.example, and your browser will happily attach
the associated cookies. If your blog isn't careful with how it validates those
evil.example could trigger actions like deleting posts or adding
their own content.
Users are also becoming more aware of how cookies can be used to track their
activity across multiple sites. However until now there hasn't been a way to
explicitly state your intent with the cookie. Your
promo_shown cookie should
only be sent in a first-party context, whereas a session cookie for a widget
meant to be embedded on other sites is intentionally there for providing the
signed-in state in a third-party context.
Explicitly state cookie usage with the
SameSite attribute #
The introduction of the
SameSite attribute (defined in
allows you to declare if your cookie should be restricted to a first-party or
same-site context. It's helpful to understand exactly what 'site' means here.
The site is the combination of the domain suffix and the part of the domain just
before it. For example, the
www.web.dev domain is part of the
If the user is on
www.web.dev and requests an image from
that is a same-site request.
The public suffix list defines this, so it's not
just top-level domains like
.com but also includes services like
my-project.github.io to count as
If the user is on
your-project.github.io and requests an image from
my-project.github.io that's a cross-site request.
SameSite attribute on a cookie provides three different ways
to control this behaviour. You can choose to not specify the attribute, or you
Lax to limit the cookie to same-site requests.
If you set
Strict, your cookie will only be sent in a
first-party context. In user terms, the cookie will only be sent if the site for
the cookie matches the site currently shown in the browser's URL bar. So, if the
promo_shown cookie is set as follows:
Set-Cookie: promo_shown=1; SameSite=Strict
When the user is on your site, then the cookie will be sent with the request as
expected. However when following a link into your site, say from another site or
via an email from a friend, on that initial request the cookie will not be sent.
This is good when you have cookies relating to functionality that will always
be behind an initial navigation, such as changing a password or making a
purchase, but is too restrictive for
promo_shown. If your reader follows the
link into the site, they want the cookie sent so their preference can be
SameSite=Lax comes in by allowing the cookie to be sent with
these top-level navigations. Let's revisit the cat article example from above
where another site is referencing your content. They make use of your photo of
the cat directly and provide a link through to your original article.
<p>Look at this amazing cat!</p>
<img src="https://blog.example/blog/img/amazing-cat.png" />
<p>Read the <a href="https://blog.example/blog/cat.html">article</a>.</p>
And the cookie has been set as so:
Set-Cookie: promo_shown=1; SameSite=Lax
When the reader is on the other person's blog the cookie will not be sent
when the browser requests
amazing-cat.png. However when the reader follows the
link through to
cat.html on your blog, that request will include the
cookie. This makes
Lax a good choice for cookies affecting the display of the
Strict being useful for cookies related to actions your user is
Lax are a complete solution for your site's security.
Cookies are sent as part of the user's request and you should treat them the
same as any other user input. That means sanitizing and validating the input.
Never use a cookie to store data you consider a server-side secret.
Finally there is the option of not specifying the value which has previously
been the way of implicitly stating that you want the cookie to be sent in all
contexts. In the latest draft of
is being made explicit by introducing a new value of
SameSite=None. This means
you can use
None to clearly communicate that you intentionally want the cookie
sent in a third-party context.
If you provide a service that other sites consume such as widgets, embedded
content, affiliate programs, advertising, or sign-in across multiple sites
then you should use
None to ensure your intent is clear.
Changes to the default behavior without SameSite #
SameSite attribute is widely supported, it has unfortunately not
been widely adopted by developers. The open default of sending cookies
everywhere means all use cases work but leaves the user vulnerable to CSRF and
unintentional information leakage. To encourage developers to state their intent
and provide users with a safer experience, the IETF proposal,
Incrementally Better Cookies
lays out two key changes:
- Cookies without a
SameSiteattribute will be treated as
- Cookies with
SameSite=Nonemust also specify
Secure, meaning they require a secure context.
Chrome implements this default behavior as of version 84.
has them available to test as of Firefox 69 and will make them default behaviors
in the future. To test these behaviors in Firefox, open
about:config and set
also plans to change its default behaviors.
This article will be updated as additional browsers announce support.
SameSite=Lax by default #
While this is intended to apply a more secure default, you should ideally set an
SameSite attribute rather than relying on the browser to apply that
for you. This makes your intent for the cookie explicit and improves the chances
of a consistent experience across browsers.
The default behaviour applied by Chrome is slightly more permissive than an
SameSite=Lax as it will allow certain cookies to be sent on top-level
POST requests. You can see the exact details on
the blink-dev announcement.
This is intended as a temporary mitigation, you should still be fixing your
cross-site cookies to use
SameSite=None must be secure #
You can test this behavior as of Chrome 76 by enabling
about://flags/#cookies-without-same-site-must-be-secure and from Firefox 69
about:config by setting
You will want to apply this when setting new cookies and actively refresh existing cookies even if they are not approaching their expiry date.
If you rely on any services that provide third-party content on your site, you should also check with the provider that they are updating their services. You may need to update your dependencies or snippets to ensure that your site picks up the new behavior.
Both of these changes are backwards-compatible with browsers that have correctly
implemented the previous version of the
SameSite attribute, or just do not
support it at all. By applying these changes to your cookies, you are making
their intended use explicit rather than relying on the default behavior of the
browser. Likewise, any clients that do not recognize
SameSite=None as of yet
should ignore it and carry on as if the attribute was not set.
A number of older versions of browsers including Chrome, Safari, and UC browser
are incompatible with the new
None attribute and may ignore or restrict the
cookie. This behavior is fixed in current versions, but you should check your
traffic to determine what proportion of your users are affected. You can see the
list of known incompatible clients on the Chromium site.
SameSite cookie recipes #
For further detail on exactly how to update your cookies to successfully handle
these changes to
SameSite=None and the difference in browser behavior, head to
the follow up article, SameSite cookie recipes.
Kind thanks for contributions and feedback from Lily Chen, Malte Ubl, Mike West, Rob Dodson, Tom Steiner, and Vivek Sekhar